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ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. GLEAVE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and Respondent,

SIXTH MEMORANDUM OF
NEWLY UNCOVERED
AUTHORITY

vs.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a
corporation, UTAH RAILWAY
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellants
and Respondents,

C a s e No. 20166

&b0O5"l~C4\

C a s e No. 20300

8b0O58-CA

Consolidated
Case No. 20300

and
THE STATE OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

Category No. 13b

Defendant-Respondent.
The Brief of Appellant at Point III argues that the
State of Utah has exclusive jurisdiction (or preemption) over
the

installation

of

signals

at

railroad

crossings.

The

response to that argument is found at Point III and Exhibit C
of Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant Robert L.
Gleave.

Although plaintiff has filed six memoranda, these
memoranda generally deal with cases which did not exist when
the original brief was written.

With respect to those arguments, Gleave cites the
additional authority of Bonnie Chloe Wilde v. Denver and Ric
Grande Western

R. R. Co.

(opinion

attached).

unpublished opinion of a federal trial court.

This

is an

However, the

issues are identical.
In Wilde, the Denver & Rio Grande argued (as they did
in Gleave that:
The defendant [Denver & Rio Grande] argues
strenuously that it cannot be found negligent for failing to do something the law
prohibits it from doing.
The railroad
relies on this court's conclusion of law in
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v.
West
Jordan
Municipal
Corporation,
C-82-344J,judgment entered May 28, 1982.
In that case, this court concluded that the
State of Utah has given the Utah department
of transportation the exclusive authority
"to determine, prescribe, and allocate the
costs of protecting railroad grade crossings within the State of Utah." Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p.6, filed
May 28, 1982. This court also concluded
that the laws of the State of Utah preempt
any attempt by a municipality to add
additional warnings at grade crossings.
From this, the railroad concludes that it
is prohibited
from installing warning
devices at grade crossings without an order
from the department of transportation.
(Slip Opinion at p.9 and 10.)
Judge Jenkins disposed of that argument summarily:
The Court does not need to reach the merits
of the railroad's contention. Even assuming that the railroad cannot install
warnings at grade crossings without an
express order from the department of
transportation, the railroad nevertheless
is not relieved of its duty to operate its
trains with reasonable care. If a crossing
is more than ordinarily hazardous, the
railroad cannot simply ignore that fact and
put the public in peril until the department of transportation acts.
Until the
department
acts,
the
reasonable
care
2

standard requires the railroad to take
other measures to reduce the risks of a
crossing commensurate with the risks it
imposes on the public. These measures may
include posting a flagman, slowing down its
trains, or perhaps stopping service through
a crossing altogether if there is no other
way
to
satisfy
the
reasonable
care
standard.
It should be noted that, in Gleave, the Denver &
Rio Grande relies upon Judge Jenkins decision in Denver &
Rio Grande v. West Jordan Municipal Corp..
Appellant, p. 33 n.3 and Exhibit R.)

(See Brief of

However, Denver & Rio

Grande failed to disclose that the very same Judge (Jenkins)
specifically distinguished the West Jordan case in the later
2
Wilde case (quoted supra).
Therefore,

it

appears

that

the

law

firm

of

VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy is in direct violation
of

DR7-106(B)(1)

of

the

Revised

Rules

of

Professional

Conduct of the Utah Bar:
In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a
lawyer shall disclose . . . legal authority
in the controlling jurisdiction known to
him to be directly adverse to the position
of his client and which is not disclosed by
opposing counsel.
DATED this 2md day of ^ / t l ^ ^ i ^ ^
, 198^.
ROBERT7J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Robert Gleave

Grande wrote its opening brief, but before Denver & Rio
Grande filed its reply brief.

3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

Sixth

Memorandum

of

Newly

Uncovered

Authority,

(Gleave vs. Denver & Rio Grande vs. State of Utah), was mailed
via

U.S.
l^yuiCikjJ

Mail,

postage

prepaid,

this

t 198^$, to the following:

E. Scott Savage, Esq.
Michael F. Richman, Esq.
Patrick J. O'Hara, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for the Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company and Utah
Railway Company
50 South Main Street, Suite 16 00
P. 0. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah
84110-3400
Paul Warner, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Utah
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Utah
Department of Transportation, State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DI STRUCK OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

BONNIE CHLOE WILDE,
individually; BONNIE CHLOE
WILDE as natural parent and
legal guardian of RYAN GEORGE
WILDE, RANDALL LEVERRE WILDE,
and RUSSELL ORVIN WILDE; and
BONNIE CHLOE WILDE as
Personal Representative of
the Estate of GARTH LYNN
WILDE, Deceased,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
C-83-149J

Plaintiffs,
V•

DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant and
Counterclaimant,
v•
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ESTATE AND THE HEIRS OF
GARTH LYNN WILDE,
Counterclaim
Defendants.

This matter came before the court on the defendant's motion
for partial summary judgment.

It raises three issues:

(1)

Whether a railroad has a common law duty to install additional
warning devices at a railroad grade crossing that is more than
ordinarily dangerous; (2) Whether the particular railroad
crossing involved in this lawsuit is, as a matter of law, no more
hazardous than ordinarily hazardous; and (3)

Whether Garth

FILE COPY
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Wilde, the driver of the car and the plaintiffs' deceased husband
and father, was negligent as a matter of law.
On June 22, 1984, the court heard oral arguments on the
motion.

Lynn C. Harris, Allen K. Young, and Edward P.

appeared for the plaintiffs.
appeared for the defendant.
ruling on the motion.

Moriarity

E. Scott Savage and David J. Jordan
At that time, the court reserved

After considering the oral arguments and

the extensive memoranda and affidavits filed by the parties, the
court now enters this memorandum opinion.
This litigation arose from an accident between the
defendant's train and the automobile in which the plaintiffs were
riding.

After resolving all questions of fact in favor of the

plaintiffs, the undisputed facts for the purpose of this motion
are as follows.

The accident occured at a railroad crossing on

700 South Street in Springville, Utah.

700 South runs east to

west, and the defendant's tracks run southeast to northwest.

At

approximately 170 West on 700 South, the defendant's tracks
intersect 700 South at a 44 degree angle.

A driver westbound on

700 South would have to turn his head and look behind him to be
able to see a northwesterly bound train overtaking him from the
rear.
Approximately 35 feet south of 700 South and 120 feet east
of the crossing, a triplex temporarily blocks the view of a
driver westbound on 700 South so that he cannot see a
northwesterly bound train overtaking him until he passes the
triplex.

However, at a point about 50 feet from the crossing, a
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westbound driver's view of the tracks is unobstructed for at
least 500 feet.
The crossing itself is marked with the familiar white
crossbuck "Railroad Crossing" warning sign on a white post.

In

1976, the defendant received permission from the City of
Springville to attach a stop sign to the white post directly
beneath the crossbuck.
the ground.

The stop sign itself is 42 inches above

The two signs are situated 11 feet north of 700

South and 14 feet northeast of the tracks.

Because of the acute

angle that the tracks intersect the road, a westbound car that
stops at a point even with the two signs could protrude up to 2
1/2 feet onto the tracks even if the car remains on the right
half of the road.
About thirty yards west of the crossing a second set of
tracks intersects 700 South.

That crossing is marked with a

standard crossbuck sign, as well as with a stop sign attached to
a power pole to the right of the crossbuck.
At 9:00 in the morning on February 10, 1981, Garth Wilde was
driving his family station wagon westbound on 700 South.

His

wife and three of his four children were riding with him.
Although the air was clear, the road was covered with snow and
was extremely slick.

At that time, a train was approaching from

the northeast on the second set of tracks.

Garth Wilde attempted

to stop his automobile, which slid on the icy road until it came
to a stop on the first set of tracks.

Bonnie Wilde stated in her

deposition that as soon as the train on the second set of tracks
had cleared the intersection, she looked to the left to see why
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her husband had not begun to drive.

Immediately as she looked to

her left, a train approaching from the southwest collided with
their family car, killing Garth Wilde and one of the children.
See Deposition of Bonnie Chloe Wilde at p. 37.

Bonnie Wilde and

the two children with her who survived sustained physical
injuries.

It is not clear whether Garth Wilde attempted to stop

because he saw the train on the second set of tracks, because he
saw the train on the first set of tracks, or because he saw the
stop sign and the crossbuck.
The train involved in the accident was travelling at least
40 miles per hour.

The engineer has testified that as soon as it

became apparent that a collision was imminent, he attempted to
stop the train.

See Deposition of Ray C. Brown, pp. 97-98.

Bonnie Wilde and her three surviving children brought this
action in state court claiming damages both for personal injury
and for wrongful death.
theory.

The action is footed on a negligence

Specifically, they assert that the railroad failed to

blow a whistle, ring a bell, or otherwise warn motorists that a
train was approaching.

They also assert that the railroad knew

the crossing was "extrahazardous" and that the railroad breached
a duty to erect additional warnings commensurate with the
extrahazardous nature of the crossing.

Finally, they assert that

the railroad operated its train at an excessive rate of speed,
that the railroad failed to stop its train to avoid the accident,
and that the railroad failed to maintain its equipment in proper
repair to be able to avoid the accident.
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After removing the case to federal court, the defendant
railroad answered the complaint and counterclaimed against the
personal representative of the estate of Garth Wilde,

The

railroad asserts that Garth Wilde was negligent and that his
negligence was a cause of the accident.
In its motion for partial summary judgment, the defendant
railroad asks this court to rule as a matter of law that the
railroad has no duty to supplement warnings at a grade crossing
that is more than ordinarily hazardous.

It also asks the court

to rule as a matter of law that the crossing involved in this
case was no more hazardous than ordinarily hazardous.

Finally,

it asks the court to rule as a matter of law that Garth Wilde was
negligent and that his negligence was a cause of the accident.!

I.
The plaintiffs allege in their complaint that a railroad has
an independent duty to install additional warning devices at a
grade crossing that is more than ordinarily dangerous.

They

claim that a failure to install such warning devices is a breach
of that duty.

They further claim that if an injury proximately

results from that breach, the railroad is liable to pay damages.2
1 The railroad has also asked this court to rule as a matter
of law that Garth Wilde's negligence was the sole proximate cause
of the accident. The court does not find it necessary to reach
this issue.
2

Paragraph 8(c) of the complaint provides as follows:
Defendant had an independent duty to
maintain said crossing in a safe and reasonable
manner and did maintain said intersection without
any warning, bell, gong, signal, or device,
flasher system, or any method to warn the
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The defendant railroad argues in its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment that the Utah legislature abolished the
independent duty to install warnings when it passed section
54-4-15.1 of the Utah Code.3

The railroad argues that section

54-4-15.1 gives the department of transportation exclusive
authority to install warnings at grade crossings, and, therefore,
the railroad no longer has that duty.
The plaintiffs argue that section 54-4-15.1 does not give
exclusive authority to the department of transportation to
install warning devices, and that section 54-4-15.1 did not
abrogate the railroad's independent duty to install adequate

oncoming traffic, and more particularly the above
named plaintiffs, of the approach of any of its
trains at any time, and more particularly on
February 10, 1981. Defendant knew, or in the
exercise of ordinary prudence and care should
have known, that said crossing being wholly
unprotected would constitute a menace, hazard,
and a danger to persons, and would be an
ultrahazardous crossing to persons, and more
particularly the above named plaintiffs, who
might be traveling along 700 South near said
railroad crossing.
Complaint, 1 8(c), filed January 27, 1983.
3

Section 54-4-15.1 provides as follows:
The department of transportation so as to promote
the public safety shall as prescribed in this act provide
for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and
improving of automatic and other safety appliances,
signals or devices at grade crossings on public highways
or roads over the tracks of any railroad or street
railroad corporation in this state.

54-4-15.1 U.C.A. (1953, as amended).
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warnings at a grade crossing that is more than ordinarily
dangerous.
The arguments of both parties are misplaced.

Under Utah

law, a railroad has no independent duty to install warning
devices at a grade crossing that is more than ordinarily
dangerous.4

A railroad does have a duty to exercise reasonable

care in the operation of its trains to avoid injuring the public.
English v. Southern Pacific Co., 13 Utah 407, 45 P. 47, 50.
(1896).

The Utah Supreme Court has held as a matter of law that

a railroad does not breach that duty by operating a train through
a grade crossing without first taking additional precautions so
long as the crossing is not "more than ordinarily hazardous.11
Bridges v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 26 Utah 2d 281, 488 P.2d
738, 739 (1971).

See also English, 45 P. at 50.

However,

neither English nor Bridges establishes an independent duty to
erect warnings at a crossing that is more than ordinarily
hazardous.5

See also Hobbs v. Denver & Rio Grande Western

^ The plaintiffs do not point to a statute that imposes such a
duty. Section 56-1-11 of the Utah Code provides that a "railroad
company shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to make
and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any
line of travel crosses its road." However, the Utah cases that
rely on this section find the railroad liable for negligence in
failing to maintain the crossing itself, not for failing to erect
warnings. See Denkers v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 18, 171
P. 999, 1007-TJ3 (1913) (public road below the elevation of the
tracks; no fill between the rails); cf. Van Wagoner v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co., 112 Utah 218, TE6 P.2d 293,"" 304 (1947).
5 Some of the language in English could be interpreted to mean
that an independent duty is imposed on a railroad to post a
flagman or install additional warning devices to mark a grade
crossing that: is more than ordinarily dangerous. For example,
the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
The second matter of negligence that is allege
is a failure to provide a switchman or flagman at

-8Railroad, 677 P.2d 1128, 1129 (Utah 1984).
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Accordingly, there

was no common law duty for the legislature to abolish when it
enacted section 54-4-15.1.
Not only are the parties1 arguments with regard to the
so-called independent duty to erect warnings contrary to Utah
law, the parties1 focus on that duty is also misleading.

The

mischief that causes the harm at a grade crossing is not a
failure to install flashing lights or a gate, for such a failure,
standing alone, can never cause an injury.

The mischief that

causes the harm at a grade crossing is the negligent operation of
a train.

Until a railroad sends one of its trains down the

tracks and through a crossing, the public is not in danger
regardless of how hazardous that crossing might be.

But when a

railroad undertakes to operate a train through a grade crossing,
the railroad has a duty to do so through the exercise reasonable
care to avoid injuring the public.
The Bridges and English cases must be read in light of the
railroad's duty.
add to it.^

They do not alter that duty, and they do not

They merely stand for the proposition that, as a
the crossing, or to provide gates which should be
closed and opened, so as to prevent passengers
upon the highway from being exposed to danger.
The plaintiffs claim that under the facts and
circumstances developed in this case, that this
became a duty which the defendants owed to the
traveling public.

45 P. at 49. However, a careful reading of the rest of the
instruction, in addition to the other parts of the opinion,
indicates that the court did not intend to create a separate,
independent duty.
6

Hickman v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 117 Utah 136, 213
P.2d F507 b^A (l^^U), states that EngIisTT"indicates that the
duty where trains cross highways may be increased, depending on
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matter of law, a railroad does not breach that duty by running a
train through a grade crossing without first taking additional
precautions so long as the grade crossing is not more than
ordinarily dangerous.

In other words, the Utah Court has

determined as a matter of law that unless conditions at the
crossing "render the warning employed at the crossing . . .
inadequate to warn the public of danger,tf a reasonable person
would not erect additional warnings before operating a train
through that crossing.

Bridges, 488 P.2d at 739,

However, if a

fact finder determines that the conditions around the grade
crossing do "render the warning employed at the crossing . . .
inadequate to warn the public of danger," the fact finder is then
in the position to determine whether the railroad exercised
reasonable care in running a train through that crossing without
taking further precautions.

I^d.

See also Hickman v. Union

Pacific Railroad Co., 117 Utah 136, 213 P.2d 650, 654 (1950);
English, 45 P. at 50.
The defendant argues strenuously that it cannot be found
negligent for failing to do something the law prohibits it from
doing.7

The railroad relies on this court's conclusion of law

the locality and traffic." Actually, the duty always remains the
same: The railroad must do what a reasonable man would do under
similar circumstances. However, what a reasonable man would do
changes as the circumstances change. In that sense, a railroad's
duty may be increased or decreased by the circumstances.
7

The defendant also asserts that the court should follow the
Montana Supreme Court's decision in Penn v. Burlington Northern,
Inc., 185 Mont. 223, 605 P.2d 600 ( 1 9 W T — H T t f i T t case,TF£
Montana Supreme Court ruled that the trial court was correct in
refusing to charge the jury that the railroad was negligent per
se for failing to install the type of warnings the Manual on
Traffic Control Devices required at extrahazardous crossings:
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in Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. West Jordan
Municipal Corporation, C-82-344J, judgment entered May 28, 1982. 8
In that case, this court concluded that the State of Utah has
given the Utah department of transportation the exclusive
authority

fl

to determine, prescribe, and allocate the costs of

protecting railroad grade crossings within the State of Utah.11
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 6, filed May 28,
1982.

This court also concluded that the laws of the State of

Utah preempt any attempt by a municipality to add additional
warnings at grade crossings.

From this, the railroad concludes

that it is prohibited from installing warning devices at grade
crossings without an order from the department of transportation.

[I]n Montana, the Manual does not have equal
dignity with statutory law. There must be
evidence that the Highway Commission directed the
installation of additional warning signals before
Burlington Northern can be charged with a duty to
make such installations.
Id. at 604. Based on these conclusions, the Montana court held
TFat the railroad could not be found negligent per se for failing
to erect warnings it had not been ordered to erect. It did not
hold that a jury could not consider the lack of additional
warnings in determining whether the railroad exercised reasonable
care when it ran a train through a crossing that was more than
ordinarily hazardous. Accordingly, Perm is inapposite.
8 The railroad also points the court to two orders granting
partial summary judgment entered by other judges in this
district. Harsin v. Denver Se Rio Grande Western Railroad Co.,
C-83-0993W (D. Utah, order entered January 10, 10fl5; Bellon v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., C-83-888A (D. Utah,
order entered September 10, 19#4). Both of those orders conclude
that the authority to install warning devices at railroad grade
crossings is vested exclusively in the department of
transportation, and, therefore, as a matter of law, a railroad
cannot be found negligent for failing to install additional
warning devices. Because this court's analytical framework is
different from that used by the other courts in this district,
those conclusions are not dispositive.
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The court does not need to reach the merits of the
railroad's contention.

Even assuming that the railroad cannot

install warnings at grade crossings without an express order from
the department of transportation, the railroad nevertheless is
not relieved of its duty to operate its trains with reasonable
care.

If a crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous, the

railroad cannot simply ignore that fact and put the public in
peril until the department of transportation acts.

Until the

department acts, the reasonable care standard requires the
railroad to take other measures to reduce the risks of a crossing
commensurate with the risks it imposes on the public.

These

measures may include posting a flagman, slowing down its trains,
or perhaps stopping service through a crossing altogether if
there is no other way to satisfy the reasonable care standard.

II.
The second issue presented by the defendant's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment is whether the grade crossing involved
in this case is, as a matter of law, merely ordinarily hazardous.
Because this is a question of fact, the court, after examining
all the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,
may resolve the question against the plaintiffs only if no
reasonable minds could differ on the answer.
Utah law is clear that in order for a grade crossing to be
more than ordinarily hazardous,
there must be something in the configuration of
the land, or in the construction of the railroad,
or in the structures in the vicinity, or in the
nature or amount of the travel on the highway, or
in other conditions, which renders the warning
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employed at the crossings inadequate to warn the
public of danger.
Bridges, 488 P.2d at 739.

In other words, a fact finder must

determine from all the facts and circumstances whether the
warnings employed at the crossing adequately warn the public of
danger.
In this case, several conditions exist that could warrant a
jury finding that the warnings employed at the crossing were not
sufficient to warn the public of danger.

The tracks cross the

road at an acute angle so that a driver would have to be aware of
a train overtaking him from the rear; the train approaches from
behind at almost twice the speed of the car; a building blocks a
driver's view for a short period of time as the driver approaches
the grade crossing; the location of the warning signs, when
combined with the acute angle of the crossing, makes it possible
to stop behind the signs yet still be on the tracks; the second
train that crossed on the second track immediately before the
accident was near enough to the first set of tracks to cause
confusion; and the approach to the grade crossing was snow packed
-and slippery.

In addition, the stop sign was 18 inches lower

than the height specified in the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices.

The court cannot conclude that all reasonable

minds, when presented with all the facts and circumstances of
this particular crossing, would find that the crossbuck and a
nonconforming stop sign were sufficient to warn the public of
danger.
The defendant asserts that the test should be whether a
driver who exercises reasonable care would see the train. See
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Brown v. Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway Co., 248 Ore. 110,
431 P.2d 817, 821 (1967).
courts have applied.

However, that is not the test the Utah

The Utah court has consistently focused on

the conditions at the crossing that may or may not make the
statutory warnings ineffective.

This court can see no reason to

change that focus.
The defendant also asserts that a driver who stopped before
entering the grade crossing would have an unobstructed view of
the tracks, and therefore the crossing cannot possibly be more
than ordinarily hazardous.

See Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper

Co., 30 Utah 2d 262, 516 P.2d 1182, 1185 (1973).

The difficulty

with this argument is that it assumes the driver has sufficient
warning to stop before reaching the crossing.

If the warning is

sufficient, the crossing is, as a matter of law, no more
hazardous than ordinarily hazardous, and a zone of safety is not
relevant.

On the other hand, if the warning is not sufficient, a

zone of safety a few feet from the tracks will not be available
because a driver would not be warned in time to take advantage of
it.

Accordingly, the defendant's contention has no merit.
Finally, the defendant asserts that conditions affecting

visibility do not render a crossing more than ordinarily
hazardous unless they are created by the railroad itself.

In

support of that position, the defendant relies on Benson v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P.2d
790 (1955).

This court disagrees.

First, Bridges discusses

conditions, such as the lay of the land and structures in the
vicinity, that are not affected by the railroad.

Second, only
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one justice concurred in the opinion in Bengon.
justices concurred only in the result.

Three other

This court believes that

the Utah Supreme Court would rule that conditions at a grade
crossing can render statutory warnings inadequate even if the
railroad itself did not create those conditions.

III.
The defendant's final claim for partial summary judgment is
that Garth Wilde, the driver of the automobile, was negligent as
a matter of law.

The court can find Wilde negligent as a matter

of law only if all reasonable minds would arrive at the
conclusion that Wilde "failed to use the degree of care which an
ordinary, reasonable and prudent person would have observed for
his own safety under the circumstances."
792.

Benson, 286 P.2d at

Utah law defines the term "ordinary care under the

circumstances" in a case involving a collision at a grade
crossing:
In the absence of any special hazards or
conditions of danger, the well-established rule
in respect to the duty of travelers approaching
railroad crossings in this state is that the
traveler is required to look and listen, and if
necessary to stop to avoid being injured by
approaching trains.

In this case, the court cannot conclude as a matter of law
that all reasonable minds would agree that Wilde breached this
duty.

For the purpose of this part of the motion, the court must

assume that the grade crossing was more than ordinarily
hazardous.

Accordingly the court must also assume that the
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warnings that existed at the crossing were inadequate to warn
Wilde that he was approaching a grade crossing.

It cannot be

said as a matter of law that a driver is negligent for failing to
heed inadequate warnings.

A traveler approaching a grade

crossing has no special duty to look and listen, and if necessary
to stop, unless he is first warned that he is approaching a grade
crossing.
The defendant argues at length that all reasonable minds
would agree that a reasonable person would stop at a stop sign.9
However, the defendant virtually ignores the fact that the sign
was 18 inches lower than the height specified in the Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices.

It cannot be said that all

reasonable minds would agree that a driver exercising reasonable
care would see a nonconforming stop sign in time to stop.

The

court is not willing to conclude that Wilde's delay in stopping
was attributable to his own negligence rather than to the
nonconformity of the stop sign.

Based on an examination of all

the circumstances, the court believes that the question of
whether Garth Wilde breached his duty of care is a question of
fact for the jury.

9 The defendant does not argue that Wilde Was negligent per
se. Indeed, the defendant admits that it "has never contended in
any of its memoranda or arguments, that the doctrine of
negligence per se is applicable in this case." Supplemental
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, p. 7, filed July 17, 1984.
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IV.
In conclusion, the court would be remiss if it did not
express its criticism of the doctrine of the "more than
ordinarily hazardous" crossing.

The Utah Supreme Court should,

at its first opportunity, examine the doctrine with an eye to
eliminating it.

The court believes that instructing a fact

finder that it cannot find a railroad negligent for operating a
train through a crossing without taking additional precautions
unless it first finds that the warnings at the crossing were
inadequate to warn the public adds nothing -- except perhaps
confusion -- to an instruction that the railroad has a duty to
operate its trains with reasonable care.

If the warnings are

adequate, a jury would find that a reasonable person would not
add additional warnings.

A special doctrine is not necessary.

The railroads1 concern that juries would award damages when
there is no evidence that the warnings were inadequate is
unwarranted.

The trial court has an obligation to instruct the

jury on theories supported by evidence.

If all reasonable minds

would agree that, based on the evidence, the warnings were
sufficient, the trial court would not submit an instruction
allowing the jury to find a breach of the railroad's duty for
failing to take additional precautions.
In this case, however, the court holds that the "more than
ordinarily hazardous" crossing doctrine still exists in Utah. The
doctrine does not impose a duty on a railroad to erect additional
warnings at a crossing that is more than ordinarily dangerous.
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It merely authorizes a jury to find a railroad negligent for
failing to take additional precautions only if it first
determines whether the conditions at the crossing rendered the
warnings employed there inadequate to warn the public of danger.
In this case, the court finds that whether the warnings were
adequate is a disputed question of fact.

The court also finds

that whether Garth Wilde was negligent is also a disputed
question of fact.
The defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
DENIED.

Dated this
es mailed to counsel 4/3/85: nw
len K. Young, Esq,
>rry L. Spence, Esq.
Scott Savage, Esq.
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